EM Side Channel Analysis on Complex SoC architectures by Sohaib ul Hassan, NA
SOHAIB UL HASSAN
EM SIDE CHANNEL ANALYSIS ON COMPLEX SOC ARCHI-
TECTURES
Master of Science thesis
Examiner: Prof. Billy Bob Brumley
Examiner and topic approved by the
Faculty Council of the Faculty of
Computing and Electrical Engineering
on 8th June 2016
iABSTRACT
SOHAIB UL HASSAN: EM Side Channel Analysis on Complex SoC Architectures
Tampere University of Technology
Master of Science thesis, 66 pages
November 2016
Master's Degree Programme in Information Technology
Major: Pervasive Systems
Examiner: Prof. Billy Bob Brumley
Keywords: electromagnetic, side channel attacks, elliptic curve cryptography, wavelet
decisioning, software deﬁned radio
The EM side channel analysis is a very eﬀective technique to attack cryptographic
systems due to its non invasive nature and capability to launch an attack even with
limited resources. The EM leakage from devices can give information about compu-
tations on the processor, which can in turn reveal the internal state of the algorithm.
For security sensitive algorithms, these EM radiations can be exploited by the ad-
versary to extract secret key dependent operations hence EM side channel must be
studied for evaluating the security of these algorithms. Modern embedded devices
composed of System-on-Chip architectures are considered hard targets for EM side
channel analysis mainly due to their complex architecture. This thesis explores the
viability of EM side channel attacks on such targets. There is a comprehensive litera-
ture overview of EM side channel analysis followed by a practical side channel attack
on a SoC device using well know cryptographic library OpenSSL. The attack suc-
cessfully extracts the secret key dependent operation which can be used to retrieve
the private key in security protocols such as TLS and SSH. The thesis concludes,
with practical single trace attacks, that cryptographic implementations can still be
broken using EM side channel analysis, and a complex nature of the device have
no signiﬁcant eﬀect when combined with signal processing methods for extracting
side channel information, hence the cryptographic software implementations must
address these issues.
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11. INTRODUCTION
We are living in times ﬂooded with ubiquitous embedded devices constantly talk-
ing to each other and sharing information, creating a huge ecosystem of connected
devices. Over the past decade there has been a rapid growth in intelligence and
interconnectedness of embedded devices. Embedded systems have been the building
block of most modern devices, but the use of more complex System-on-Chip archi-
tectures and design reuse have enabled the developers to release these devices for
consumer application market at a more rapid rate. Theses complex micro archi-
tectures range from mobile devices to payment systems and to more recent trends
towards Internet-of-Things (IoT). User applications running on these devices in-
volving ﬁnancial transactions, on-line shopping and digital currency use security
protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Shell (SSH), Bitcoin which
can be exploited if not thoroughly tested for any security vulnerabilities.
The increased architectural complexity and rapid deployment of devices brings nu-
merous design and development challenges for security experts such as demand of
computational and energy eﬃciency which also signiﬁcantly impact the device se-
curity and functionality. According to [50] the processing of security primitives on
embedded devices are constrained by the computational power and throughput re-
ferred as "security processing gaps", while embedded systems powered by battery
are constrained by energy consumption "battery gaps", which sets a limit on the
amount of energy a secure operation can draw, requiring both an eﬃcient soft-
ware and hardware implementations. There is another gap which is perhaps more
challenging from information theoretic and cryptographic point of view: between
security critical operations running as data encryption standards or client server
communication protocols, and their provable secure properties. In order to address
these gaps information security experts must develop cryptographic implementations
that are not only computationally eﬃcient but also secure at the same time.
Typically cryptanalysis focuses on targeting the mathematical design of the crypto-
1. Introduction 2
graphic systems to evaluate the strength of the cryptographic system. Side channels
or Covert Channels on the other hand are those communication channels that take
advantage of the physical characteristics of the secure systems. They are also termed
as implementation attacks as they try to target the weak implementation of the cryp-
tographic systems. These channels can be exploited to gather information in a way
that can breach the conﬁdentiality and integrity of cryptographic systems. There
are diﬀerent side channels that have bee studied such as
• Timing Attack [12]
• Power Analysis Attack [39]
• Electromagnetic (EM) Side Channel Analysis Attack [40]
• Acoustic Side Channel Analysis Attack [25]
The techniques used to target these side channels usually vary based on the phys-
ical properties of the channel, however the information obtained is more or less
similar. These channels can either reveal complete information to break the sys-
tem or additional cryptographic/mathematical techniques are used on the gathered
information.
The public key cryptographic implementations such as Rivest Shamire Adleman
(RSA) modular exponentiation and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) point mul-
tiplication contain operations that are dependent on the secret key. EM side channel
analysis can give information about these cryptographic operations and may reveal
the secret key. However, using only one EM signal to exploit this attack is con-
sidered a hard problem. Recently advanced signal processing methods have opened
new research area for applying cheap EM side channel attacks in presence of limited
side channel data [24, 22].
For evaluating the eﬀectiveness of EM side channel analysis single trace attacks us-
ing cheap equipment are demonstrated on ECC and RSA using well known crypto-
graphic libraries. The results indicated strong presence of EM side channel leakage
on SoC device revealing the secret key dependent operations. The architectural
complexity of SoC does play some role by introducing noise to EM measurements
however signal processing methods can be used to overcome the noise. This suggest
that EM side channel attacks are viable and can exploit the weakness in software
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implementation with low cost setup. Also since EM signals can be captured at some
distance from the device they can have practical implications, never the less they
give insight about vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations and must be
investigated with scrutiny.
Chapter 2 gives a theoretical background of cryptography. Although cryptography
is broadly divided into symmetric and asymmetric categories, the thesis work is done
on asymmetric cryptography. There is more detailed discussion on RSA and ECC.
The idea is to give an insight on how these cryptographic systems are designed and
implemented, so it is easier to follow the rest of the thesis when the actual side
channel attack is discussed.
Chapter 3 is a brief introduction and background on the topic side channel analysis.
It tries to develop from brief survey on diﬀerent side channel analysis techniques
and ﬁnally more details of Electromagnetic Side Channel Analysis which is the
basic theme of the thesis. The explanation is complemented with discussion on
some previous work in the ﬁeld. This chapter will set theoretical background of
what is to be followed as the actual work.
Chapter 4 discusses about application of signal processing techniques for EM side
channel analysis. It explains the theory behind signal representation of the EM side
channels and the signal processing method to extract the compromising side channel
frequencies, applied in the side channel attack presented in thesis.
Chapter 5 highlights the experiments carried out on ECC and RSA cyptosystems
running on SoC device and presents the results of the attacks. Chapter 6 explains
some possible ways to mitigate these side channel attacks, while Chapter 7 is the
discussion on lessons learned during the thesis and discusses some useful application
of the results obtained for carrying out future research.
42. THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography is the science of transforming semantic structure of information. It
deals with using mathematical tools and techniques for protecting critical informa-
tion. According to [42, p. 5] cryptography aims at providing a set of information
security goals as highlighted in Table 2.1. While the list is not exhaustive, it gives
some of the basic principles to qualify as a cryptographic system. In modern cryp-
tography, a cryptographic system is seen as an algorithm which provides at least a
set of two operations, "encryption -transform and hide the information and "de-
cryption -transform the encrypted information back into its original form.
Table 2.1 Information Security Goals of Cryptography
Conﬁdentiality Only authorized parties can access information
Data Integrity Information cannot be tampered by any means while
transferred between engaged parties
Entity Authentication Way to prove the identity of engaged parties
Message Authentication Way to prove that information came from the
authorized party
Signature Bind the information to the legal owner of information
Broadly speaking any cryptographic system can be classiﬁed as:
Symmetric Key Cryptography also known as private-key cryptography involves
the use of a same shared secret key between engaged parties, using the same en-
cryption and decryption method. There is a very brief discussion on symmetric
cryptography in Section 2.3, as the focus of the thesis towards asymmetric cryp-
tography. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard
(DES) are well known symmetric cryptography solutions.
Asymmetric Cryptography also known as public-key cryptography makes use of
two diﬀerent keys for doing encryption and decryption. Section 2.4 explains it in
more detail, with examples on RSA and ECC.
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Figure 2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Protocols are applications of cryptography algorithms on top of communication
layer protocols for secure transfer of information between sender and receiver. TLS
is one of the most widely used protocols on the Internet for maintaining secure
sessions between client and server on the Internet.
2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key cryptography can be best understood by Figure 2.1. The two engag-
ing parties Alice and Bob communicate over an insecured channel. Alice encrypts
the secret message m with private key k using an encryption function enc to out-
put a cipher text c and send it to Bob. On the receiving end Bob decrypts the
cipher text c using the same private key k and decryption function dec to get back
the original message m. For this scheme to work, the secret key k must be shared
among the communicating parties through a secure channel. Another important
aspect, encryption and decryption functions in symmetric key cryptography are
usually same. The private key sharing is one of the major challenges in symmetric
key cryptography. Symmetric key cryptosystems are designed either as:
Stream Ciphers perform encryption or decryption on each incoming bit of message
stream using a stream of random non repeating key. The idea is to transform each
bit of plaintext to diﬀerent bits of cipher text. For a secure and robust stream cipher
the key should be true random number.
Block Ciphers breaks down the message into ﬁxed size blocks and perform en-
cryption and decryption operation on the block.
More detailed information on symmetric key cipher can be found here [42, p. 15].
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Figure 2.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
The remaining of the thesis will talk about asymmetric cryptography.
2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography deals with the problem of private key distribution by
using a pair of keys, private key -which is not shared and kept secret and public
key -which is shared and publicly available hence the term public key cryptogra-
phy. Unlike the symmetric key cryptosystems, here the encryption and decryption
functions are diﬀerent, and in a typical case the public key is used to perform en-
cryption while the decryption uses private key. Figure 2.2 depicts a typical public
key cryptosystem. Here Alice wants to send Bob an encrypted message which only
Bob can see. Bob generates a pair of public and private keys (e,d) and share the
public key e. Allice uses the public key e provided by Bob to encrypt the message
m and generate the cipher text c. Bob can then use his private key d to decrypt
c and get the original message m. For a secure public key cryptosystem it is not
possible to generate the private key given the public key. The only drawback is that
these cryptosystems are computationally expensive especially on embedded devices
with low computational power. Public key cryptosystems are widely studied and
practiced in modern cryptography with applications such as secret key exchange,
digital signature, digital certiﬁcates or use as encryption tools [42, p. 283].
2.2.1 Rivest Shamire Adleman (RSA)
RSA is one of the widely deployed cryptosystems. Most of the security protocols on
the Internet use RSA for secret key exchange, digital signature schemes and issuing
certiﬁcates. RSA is based on integer factorization of the product of two large prime
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numbers which is considered a hard mathematical problem; however this also adds
to the computational complexity and requires use of more eﬃcient implementation
techniques.
Mathematics of RSA [42, p. 285] is based on modular arithmetic in integer ring
Zn [42, p. 76]. RSA ﬁrst generates key using these steps
• Generate two large prime numbers p and q where p 6= q and p is roughly same
size as q
• Calculate the modulus n = pq
• Calculate the Euler Totient Function [42, p. 65] φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
• Choose public exponent randomly from e ∈ 1, 2, ..., φ(n)− 1 where gcd(e, φ(n)) =
1
• Compute a unique d which is the private exponent such that d = e−1 mod
(φ(n))
• Here (n, e) becomes the public key and d is the private part. Knowing n and
e it should be infeasible to generate d [31, p. 12].
Using the public exponent e RSA performs encryption whereas decryption is per-
formed using the private exponent d.
Encryption: c = me(mod(n)) where c is the cipher text and m is the message
Decryption: m = cd(mod(n)) to get back the original message m
Implementation of RSA heavily relies on modular exponentiation of large prime
numbers. Usually p and q are chosen to be 512 -2048 bit numbers. This means
that maximum bit length of encryption or decryption is n = pq. Also n should be
chosen in a way that it gives many p and q pairs. Exponentiation of big numbers
is computationally very slow for practical use. As an example consider a 1024
bit number n. The simplest method for calculating the modular exponentiation is
Square followed by sequence of Multiply operations
Square(n)− > Multiply(n2)− > Multiply(n3)− > Multiply(n4)− > ...
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Considering that we need this exponentiation for creating HTTPS session on a
mobile device we need 21024 multiplications, which is infeasible. This requires use
of Fast Exponentiation methods. The most commonly used method is the left-to-
right square and multiply or binary algorithm [36] which scans the exponent
bits from left MSB to right LSB. The accumulator c is ﬁrst initialized to the input x.
If the current scanned bit is '1' then a multiply operation is followed after a square
and stored in the accumulator c. The method is listed in Algorithm 2.1.
Square_and_Multiply( x,d,n )
x-> input
d-> exponent bits
n-> modulus
c = x
for i = size(d)-1 to 0
c = c^2 mod(n)
i f d(i)==1
c = c * x mod(n)
return c
Algorithm 2.1 RSA left-to-right Square and Multiply Method
There is another more eﬃcient implementation called m-ary algorithm [36] listed
in Algorithm 2.2. This technique requires scanning the bits of the exponent log2m
at a time instead of just one bit like in the previous case. The method uses binary
expansion of the exponent using a partition function. The idea is to partition the
exponent into blocks s of ﬁxed length r such that sr = k with 0 padding to make
it equal to length k if necessary. Rest of the algorithm works similar to Algorithm
1 i.e. scanning bits of exponents and raising the input 2-to-the-power of r at each
step. There is a multiplication of the input with x to the power Wi where Wi is
the non-zero value of r bits scanned in each step.
The problem with m-ary algorithm method is the number of multiplication opera-
tions depends on the size of the partition of exponent bits. If its an n-bit partition,
the number of multiplications increase as n approaches to 0. However as n ap-
proaches to inﬁnity the probability of multiplication increase, considering there is
equal probability for occurrence of 0 and 1 in exponent. For an optimal solution the
exponent bits are decomposed into zero and non-zero words Wi of variable length,
by making sure that for each non-zero word the LSB is 1, hence eﬀectively increasing
the probability of zero word occurrence. The technique is known as sliding window
2.2. Asymmetric Cryptography 9
[36] and the algorithm is listed in Algorithm 2.3. Square and Multiply operations
takes more time to execute then just Square operation, this kind of timing variation
is critical in side channel attacks. In EM analysis the amount of power consumed
is directly correlated to the side channel leakage, so heavy operations should give
more EM leakage.
m_Ary( x,d,n )
x-> input
d-> exponent bits
n-> modulus
w-> window size
Precompute x^i(mod(n)) for i=2,3 .. m-1
Decompose d into r-bit words W(i) for i = 0,1,2,..,s-1
c = x^W(s-1) mod(n)
for i = s-2 to 0
c = c^(2^r) mod(n)
i f W(i) != 0
c = c * x^W(i) mod(n)
return c
Algorithm 2.2 RSA m-ary method
Sliding_Window( x,d,n )
x-> input
d-> exponent bits
n-> modulus
w-> window size
Precompute x^i(mod(n)) for i=3,5,7 .. 2^(d-1)
Decompose d into zero and non zero words W(i) of fixed
↪→ size where i = 0,1,2,..,s-1
c = x^W(s-1) mod(n)
for i = s-2 to 0
c = c^(2^ length(W(i))) mod(n)
i f W(i) != 0
c = c * x^W(i) mod(n)
return c
Algorithm 2.3 RSA Sliding Window Method
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2.2.2 Eliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
The use of large prime factorization hence large key size means more power con-
sumption and memory requirements which is not practical in power and memory
constrained devices such as mobile devices. Also large digital certiﬁcates can become
bottleneck in wireless applications. As an alternate solution the ﬁrst breakthrough
was discovered by Koblitz and Miller who purposed Elliptic Curve Cryptography
with cryptographic proven properties while using smaller secret key.
Mathematics of ECC
The elliptic curve E is a set of points over ﬁnite ﬁeld F deﬁned by the Weierstrass
equation [31, p. 76]
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
The above equation is further reduced for prime ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp where p > 3
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b
These set of points on the elliptic curve belongs to E(Fp) which is an additive
abelian group over the prime ﬁeld with identity element at point of inﬁnity (∞).
The Elliptic curve cryptography is based on the fact that point multiplication of a
point P with a secret scalar d yields a new point Q on the curve over Fp where p
is large, it should be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd d knowing P and Q. Given
the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2)
• point addition P + Q gives a third point R = (x3, y3) on the curve, which is
the reﬂection of point of intersection between the curve and line with slope λ
passing through P and Q, given by equation
x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 where λ = y2−y1x2−x1
• similarly point doubling P + P = 2P is the reﬂection of point of intersection
between the curve and the tangent line passing through P
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Figure 2.3 Elliptic Curve Point Addition and Double
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1 where λ = 3x
2
1+a
2y1
The geometric interpretation of point addition and doubling is shown in Figure 2.3.
The point addition generates a new point R which is a projection about x-axis of
point of intersection −R on the curve with line passing through P and Q, where as
point doubling generates a new point R which is a projection about x-axis of point
of intersection −R on the curve with tangent line at point P .
Implementation of ECC
Elliptic curve cryptography requires adding points on a curve in ﬁnite ﬁled repeat-
edly d times to generate a new point on the curve, where d is the secret scalar
Add(P )− > Add(2P )− > Add(3P )− > Add(4P )− > ...
This point multiplication with scalar is the most computationally expensive op-
eration in ECC so more eﬃcient methods are required for speed up. The use of
point doubling where appropriate can reduce execution times. The reason is that
each point addition and doubling consists of multiple square and multiply operation
where point addition dominates in the number of operations. Before looking into the
actual point multiplication method, we will ﬁrst establish how the individual point
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addition and point double operations execute. Looking at the mathematical inter-
pretation of point addition and doubling in aﬃne coordinates we can observe that
it requires ﬁnite ﬁeld inversions, which are not eﬃcient to perform on the hardware.
Hence more eﬃcient methods to minimize these inversions have come forth [17, 48]
which uses alternate coordinate systems such as projective coordinates, Jacobian
coordinates, Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinates and Lambda coordinates. Often
mixed coordinate systems are used to take advantage of the diﬀerent coordinate
system based on the operation on the point.
Point_Addition( P,Q,E )
P = (X_1 , Y_1 , Z_1) -> input point in Jacobian
↪→ coordinate
Q = (X_2 , x_2) -> input point in Affine coordinate
E: y^2 = x^3 + a * x +b -> input curve where a=-3
P + Q = ( X_3 , Y_3 , Z_3) -> output in Jacobian
↪→ coordinate
i f Q = infinity return P
i f P = infinity return (X_2 , Y_2 , 1)
T_1 = Z_1^2
T_2 = T_1 * Z_1
T_1 = T_1 * x_2
T_2 = T_2 * y_2
T_1 = T_1 - X_1
T_2 = T_2 - Y_1
i f T_1 = 0 and T_2 = 0 return (P+P)
i f T_1 = 0 and T_2 != 0 return infinity
Z_3 = Z_1 * T_1
T_3 = T_1^2
T_4 = T_3 * T_1
T_3 = T_3 * X_1
T_1 = 2(T_3)
X_3 = T_2^2
X_3 = X_3 - T_1
X_3 = X_3 - T_4
T_3 = T_3 - X_3
T_3 = T_3 * T_2
T_4 = T_4 * Y_1
Y_3 = T_3 - T_4
return( X_3 , Y_3 , Z_3)
Algorithm 2.4 Point Addition in Aﬃne-Jacobian coordinates
The choice of coordinate representation depends on the curve and the type of elliptic
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curve point multiplication method. For example, the point addition in Jacobian
coordinate takes 12 multiply and 4 square operations while point doubling takes
4 multiply and 4 square operations, while on the other hand point additions and
point doubling take 12 multiply 2 squares and 7 multiply 3 squares respectively in
projective coordinate system [31, p. 92]. Clearly we can see point addition for
Point_Doubling( P,Q,E )
P = (X_1 , Y_1 , Z_1) -> input point in Jacobian
↪→ coordinate
E: y^2 = x^3 + a * x +b -> input curve where a=-3
P + P = 2(P) = ( X_3 , Y_3 , Z_3) -> output in Jacobian
↪→ coordinate
i f P = infinity return infinity
T_1 = Z_1^2
T_2 = X_1 - T_1
T_1 = X_1 + T_1
T_2 = T_2 * T_1
T_2 = 3(T_2)
Y_3 = 2(Y_1)
Z_3 = Y_3 * Z_1
Y_3 = Y_3^2
T_3 = Y_3 * X_1
Y_3 = Y_3^2
Y_3 = Y_3 / 2
X_3 = T_2^2
T_1 = 2(T_3)
X_3 = X_3 - T_1
T_1 = T_3 - X_3
T_1 = T_1 * T_2
Y_3 = T_1 - Y_3
return( X_3 , Y_3 , Z_3)
Algorithm 2.5 Point Double in Jacobian coordinates
projective takes more time to execute than Jacobian coordinates however point
multiplication takes more time in Jacobian coordinates. Algorithm 2.4 gives the
listing for instructions performed during one point addition operations in mixed
Aﬃne-Jacobian coordinate giving 8 multiply and 3 square operations, where as
Algorithm 2.5 gives point double operation in Jacobian coordinates with 4 multiply
and 4 square operations. The two operations are still expensive but due to diﬀerence
in the execution order and number of instructions in point addition and double there
is a timing variation in their execution which can be exploited through side channel
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leakage as discussed in Chapter3 and Chapter5.
In order to compute point multiplication dP eﬃciently i.e. sequence of double and
add operations, there are a number of methods [31, 7]. The most generalized method
for point multiplications is left-to-right binary method which is analogous to
modular exponentiation method of RSA with square and multiply replaced with
double and add operations. The Algorithm 2.6 algorithm ﬁrst initialize Q to ∞,
then scans from MSB to LSB of the scalar d and performs a double operation every
time, except when the bit is 1 both double and add operations are performed. The
probability of occurrence of add operations is 1/2 the length of scalar d.
Left_to_Right_Double_ADD( P , d )
P-> input point on the curve
d-> scalar bits
Q-> point at infinity
for i = size(d)-1 to 0
Q = Q + Q
i f d(i)==1
Q = Q + P
return Q
Algorithm 2.6 Left to Write Doable and Add
As the add operations are computationally heavy more eﬃcient implementation use
the secret scalar with low density of '1' bits known asNon Adjacent Form (NAF)
point multiplication [31, p. 98]. The NAF representation of scalar has less prob-
ability for occurrence of non-zero digit hence eﬀectively reducing the number of add
operations in point multiplication. The following hold true for a NAF representation
of scalar d
• NAF representation ensures that no two adjacent digits are non-zero
• NAF representation is balanced meaning it allows both negative and positive
digits {−1, 0,+1}
• probability for occurrence of non-zero digit is 1/3 since the set contains three
digits
• the size of scalar d is smaller by at least one or less for a given NAF represen-
tation such that 2s/3 < d < 2s+1/3 where s is the size of NAF (d)
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NAF representation is very eﬀective in reducing the Hamming weight by splitting
the scalar to −1, 0, 1. Point multiplication with NAF representation ﬁrst calculates
the NAF digits of the scalar and then use a method similar to binary left-to-right.
Algorithm 2.7 gives listing for NAF point multiplication. Whenever the digit is non
zero there is a point addition.
NAF_Point_Multiplication( P , d )
P-> input point on the curve
d-> scalar bits
Q-> point at infinity
Compute NAF digits
i = 0
while d > 0
i f d = odd
d(i) = 2 - (d mod 4)
e l se
d(i) = 0
d = d - d(i)
d = d / 2
i = i + 1
end while
Compute scalar multipliation
for i = size(d)-1 to 0
Q = Q + Q
i f d(i) > 0
Q = Q + P
i f d(i) < 0
Q = Q - P
return Q
Algorithm 2.7 NAF point multiplication
To achieve better running times for NAF method instead of scanning the bits one
digit at a time it is scanned w bits at a time similarl to m-arry method in Algorithm
2. The method is wNAF point multiplication where the window size w are
the digits of scalar d computed per iteration. These pre-computed points increase
the overall performance with expense of some extra memory. Similar to the NAF
representation wNAF possess these properties
• wNAF representation ensures the adjacency property holds for w digits i.e. no
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two adjacent w digits are non-zero
• wNAF representation is balanced meaning it allows both negative and positive
digits {−2w−1, ...,−3,−1, 0,+1,+3, ..., 2w−1}
• probability for occurrence of non-zero digit is 1/(w + 1)
W_NAF_Point_Multiplication( P , d )
P-> input point on the curve
d-> scalar bits
w-> window size
Q-> point at infinity
Compute NAF digits
i = 0
while d > 0
i f d = odd
d(i) = d mods 2^w
d = d - d(i)
e l se
d(i) = 0
d = d / 2
i = i + 1
end while
Pre -compute 3(P) ,5(P) ,7(P) ,..,(2^[w-1] - 1)(P)
Compute scalar multiplication
for i = size(d)-1 to 0
Q = Q + Q
i f d(i) > 0
Q = Q + P_d(i)
i f d(i) < 0
Q = Q - P_d(i)
return Q
Algorithm 2.8 wNAF point multiplication method
The use of negative digits has a very nice property, because the ﬁeld addition is
very fast operation to perform on the Elliptic Curves, if there are precomputed
points, we only need to store the positive digits. This holds as the digits in signed
representation are in the range −2l−1 ≤ d ≤ 2l−1 so any digit greater than 2l−1 can
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be calculated easily by taking the diﬀerence from the scalar d to shift in the range
−2l−1 ≤ d ≤ 0. The wNAF method is listed in Algorithm 2.8. The point double
and add operations in all the methods discussed depend on the secret scalar bits,
which is exploited in the side channel attack discussed in the thesis.
2.3 Asymmetric Cryptography in Practice
The asymmetric cryptography algorithms are widely deployed in modern crypto-
graphic systems and secure communication protocols. Standards such as key ex-
change and digital signatures are the building blocks of these protocols. For the pur-
pose of explaining practical implications of side channel analysis on cryptographic
algorithms, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) scheme is discussed
here. In short a digital signature allows two parties to verify each other. This is
achieved by Signature Generation where a sender creates a signature for the message
to be sent using his/her private key, and Signature Veriﬁcation where the receiver
of the message veriﬁes the signature with sender's public key. The ECDSA scheme
use Elliptic Curve cryptography for Signature Creation and Veriﬁcation. The Al-
gorithm 2.9 shows the steps required for generating digital signature using ECDSA
[31, p. 98].
ECDSA_Sign( {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h} , m ,d )
{q, FR , S, a, b, P, n, h}- > Domain parameters
m-> message to sign
d-> private key/scalar
choose k from [1,n-1]
(x_1 , y_1) = k * P // point multiplication
r = x_1 mod n
i f r = 0
choose new k and start again
e = Hash(m)
s = k^-1(e + d * r) mod n
i f s = 0
choose new k and start again
return signature pair (r,s)
Algorithm 2.9 ECDSA signature
The domain parameters [54] are required set of parameters that ensure interoper-
ability and secure selection of curve parameters over the ﬁnite ﬁeld. Field element q
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is the ﬁeld size of elliptic curve in ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq represented by ﬁeld representation
FR, which is either prime Fp or binary F2m . a and b are ﬁeld elements in Fq satisfy-
ing the elliptic curve equation E(Fq) i.e. y2 = x3 +ax+ b for prime ﬁeld. P = (x, y)
is the generator points over Fq and n is the order of the base point P in the ﬁnite
ﬁeld deﬁned by Fq, such that n ' q and #G(Fq) is almost prime. The cofactor is
deﬁned by h = #G(Fq)/n where as S is the seed required to generate the elliptic
curve parameters randomly.
The line 5 of Algorithm 2.9 is doing a point multiplication of scalar k with base
point P . A new value of k is generated for every signature ensuring that line 10
cannot be solved for the private part d. Side channel attacks, however, are still a
threat, as the attacker can have access to key dependent side channel leakage and
signatures, which can be used to recover the private key. One of the most popular
uses for ECDSA now a days is in on-line digital currency Bitcoin [8]. Bitcoin uses
ECDSA private key for client authentication and digital signatures for veriﬁcation.
The curve used by Bitcoin is secp256k1, which got a lot of attention recently for
both performance improvement and secure side channel properties. The same curve
is attacked using EM Side channel leakage with a detailed discussion in Chapter 5.
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3. CRYPTANALYSIS OF SIDE CHANNELS
Experts from the ﬁeld of cryptography often deploy techniques to analyze the secu-
rity resilience of cryptographic systems by trying to break them. These techniques
involve creating mathematical and information theoretic proofs to validate the se-
curity when exposed to certain attack environments also referred as cryptanalysis.
These attack models rely on the fact that attacker is aware of all or some of the
working details of the cryptosystem, such as the algorithm, set of input (plain text)
and output (cipher text) and access to the secure system to perform operations
(encryption and decryption). The idea is to recover the secret (key) by using this
knowledge, hence breaking the system by decrypting all future secure communica-
tions. According to [51] typical attack models can be classiﬁed as black box, grey
box and white box. In black box the adversary can see the cryptographic implemen-
tations as a black box meaning without any knowledge of internals, while having
access to the input and outputs and try to analyze the statistical dependence of
the plain and cipher texts e.g. In case of grey box attack model, the adversary is
assumed to have some limited knowledge of the cryptographic implementation that
can be exploited to break the system. They are more practical in open software
implementations such as OpenSSL as the attacker has some knowledge of the im-
plementation details of cryptographic primitives. In case of embedded systems, the
security evaluation of secure implementations is modeled as grey box. Side Channel
Analysis falls in this category, where an adversary in addition to some implementa-
tion knowledge also possesses some extra information observed during the operation
of devices. The third case white box model assumes the attacker has full control over
the cryptographic implementation and its application. The purpose of white box is
to ﬁnd any security vulnerability knowing complete details in order to evaluate the
security features of the given cryptographic system and develop countermeasures for
developed attacks. Such attacks can be used for example to target the memory of
the device and extract the key from there. The work in this thesis has followed grey
box approach where some knowledge of cryptographic software implementation is
available to the attacker.
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3.1 Side Channel Attacks
A device performing cryptographic operations is usually exploitable by an attacker
using two channels. The main channel which is the intended output of the crypto-
graphic functions and a side channel which is the unintended output due to physical
behavior of the device. Where as the traditional attack tries to deploy the mathe-
matical and statistical methods to try and ﬁnd the relationship between the input
and output in presence of limited or no knowledge of cryptography algorithm, side
channel attacks on the other hand also utilize the physical covert channels to break
the cryptographic systems. Hence these attacks are proven to be more powerful as
they can even target cryptographic implementations with mathematically proven
properties. Side channels are caused due to physical nature of the device and imple-
mentation details of the algorithm, hence attacks using side channel information are
also termed as physical attacks or implementation attacks. Mathematically secure
algorithm can still be broken in presence of side channel information with a limited
resources if the implementation is weak. One of the ﬁrst published works on side
channel attacks by P. Kocher [37] explained how the timing diﬀerence in various key
dependent operations in cryptographic primitives show strong correlations to the
side channels such as power consumption of the device or memory access pattern.
Broadly speaking the side channel information a.k.a. side channel leakage can be
targeted in diﬀerent ways to launch an attack depending on the side channel physi-
cal properties such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations, the device
under attack such as embedded processor, cryptographic primitive implementation
such as Openssl RSA and the ratio between the amount of side channel leakage to
the noise. For a successful attack, it is important to ﬁrst identify the side channel
which is susceptible to leak information that can be exploited. This require in depth
analysis of the channel itself while observing the behavior of the target system. A
weak correlation between the side channel and device operations for example can
limit the success rate of the attack or may require additional resources in terms of
cost or equipment. The cryptanalysis which falls under the category of side channel
analysis is still relatively new, while there is no doubt about its eﬀectiveness, there
is still room for improvement by identifying new side channels and attack methods.
3.1.1 Previous Exploited Side Channels
Previous research has been able to exploit various side channels listed in this section,
whilst it is not a conclusive list.
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Timing Attacks is one of the ﬁrst published side channel attacks for modern cryp-
tography. It relies on the fact that diﬀerent computations takes diﬀerent time to
execute on a processor. These timing variations if dependent on the secret key
bits can be exploited to recover the key by identifying diﬀerent operations, such the
square and multiply of RSA [37] . First practical timing attack was demonstrated by
D. Brumley and D. Boneh on OpenSSL RSA implementation of modular exponen-
tiation [13]. The attack used a TLS handshake between OpenSSL client and server,
while probing the time it took for the server to respond over the local network and
use this timing information to retreat the private key. B. Brumley and N. Tuveri
[12] demonstrated a similar attack on OpenSSL TLS handshake for Elliptic Curve
implementation targeting the constant time scalar multiplication method.
Power Analysis Attacks is based on the idea of timing attacks but uses the
power consumption model of the hardware device running cryptographic primitives.
Introduced by Kocher et al. [38] power analysis was ﬁrst utilized for smart cards and
microprocessors by analyzing the power ﬂuctuations while cryptographic algorithms
are running. For example a square consumes less time and power to execute as
compared square and multiply, hence the diﬀerence in power consumption can be
used to recover the secret key.
Electromagnetic (EM) analysis attack is similar to power analysis but uses EM
radiations caused by current ﬂow due to ﬂuctuations in power consumption of the
device or microprocessor. These attacks does not require to tap into the physical
lines but can be measured from a distance as opposed to power cosumption. The ﬁrst
practical attack was demonstrated by Gandolﬁ et al. [20] on microchips showed EM
attacks to be more eﬀective compared to the power analysis attacks. Their study was
backed by performing attacks on multiple cryptographic algorithms using diﬀerent
probes for capturing EM radiations. More recent EM attacks on RSA and ECC
[22, 26, 24] have demonstrated that these attacks are not only practical on modern
devices such as smart phones, embedded systems and even personal computers but
they can be very eﬀective and cheap to carry out. More detailed discussion about
previous work on EM analysis in next section.
Acoustic Attacks tries to recover secret key dependent operations using the sound
emitted due to vibrations of components on a device. Fist practical attack on
4096 bit RSA was published by Genkin et al. [25] where they collected acoustic
information from PCs using microphone at very low frequencies. However these
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attacks are not as practical due to poor quality of acoustic signals.
3.1.2 Categorization of side channel attacks
Target Device Control refers to the amount of control the attackers have on the
target device and how much inﬂuence can be made on the way the operations are
executed.
• Active attacks allow greater control over the target device meaning an at-
tacker can manipulate the normal behavior of the device running some cryp-
tographic primitive.
• Passive attacks on the other hand provide an attacker with limited or no
control over the target device. Such attacks are performed while a device
operates in its normal condition, which makes it more powerful as the victim
is not aware of the actual attack being carried out.
Target Device Access puts the attacks into diﬀerent sets according to the level
of physical access to the target device [3].
• Invasive Attack requires physical access to the cryptographic device such as
dismantling of a microprocessor to expose individual data lines. Power mea-
surements on these data lines can be used in classical power analysis attacks.
In modern complex SoC systems these attacks are not so practical due to
tightly packed interconnected components. Also very minute circuitry make it
very hard and time consuming to try and ﬁnd individual data or address lines
and may require very expensive equipment to do so.
• Non-Invasive Attacks on the other hand are a powerful class of attacks that
can target the cryptographic device without any physical access. Electromag-
netic analysis falls in this class, as the EM signals can be captured from a
distance and can still be utilized to attack. These attacks are more practical
and can be used to attack real life systems such as mobile devices running
cryptographic operations. Such attacks are relatively quick to carry out, with
limited resources.
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• Semi-Invasive Attack requires some physical access to the device but with-
out dismantling to access bare metal. In fact these attacks require some phys-
ical access to enhance the capability of non-invasive attack without actually
accessing the electrical circuitry. One example is to remove shielding from a
mobile device to enhance EM leakage from the microprocessor.
The thesis is focused on EM side channel attack using non-invasive, passive attack
model. The remainder of the chapter will discuss EM side channel analysis in depth.
3.2 Electromagnetic Side Channel Analysis
EM side channel maps the key dependent cryptographic operations to the EM leak-
age. This leakage is caused due to ﬂow of current through the device. This current
ﬂow can also be measured by tapping on the power lines of the target device, how-
ever there are two main disadvantages, ﬁrst this require semi-invasive or invasive
approach to access power lines of interest and in case of SoC device many small
power lines are packed together in layers which makes them hard to access, second
often these lines are noisy due to current and voltage regulators which ﬁlters the
power lines hence making it hard to ﬁnd compromising leakage. This make EM side
channel an attractive choice, as there is no physical access to the device. Moreover
it adds spatial dimension to the measurement as the target device such as a mi-
croprocessor radiates EM signals with varying intensities depending on the location
on the surface, EM measurements can be targeted on these locations increasing the
chances of ﬁnding compromising side channel leakage. In order to analyze how to
target EM side channel, we must understand the source and physical nature of EM
radiations.
3.2.1 Source of EM Radiations
The Electromagnetic radiations are time varying electrical and magnetic ﬁelds which
travel through space carrying energy between two points, hence source of transferring
information. The origin of these electromagnetic ﬁelds are due to the ﬂow of charged
particles i.e. the current through a conductor. A charged particle such as an electron
creates an electric ﬁeld around it while the movement of these charged particles
through conductor causes magnetic ﬁelds. The higher the concentration of charged
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Figure 3.1 CMOS Inverter Charging and Discharging
particles in space the stronger the electric ﬁeld, similarly the higher the velocity of
these charged particles the stronger the magnetic ﬁeld. The EM radiation travels as
sinusoidal waves due to changing electric and magnetic ﬁelds, by sinusoidal it means
they have frequency, phase and time information, which is very important from side
channel perspective. In order to really understand the origin of compromising EM
radiations or signals in the cryptographic device, we need to need to ﬁrst understand
the source of current that ﬂows through various components of the device.
The building block of modern complex SoC are digital logic circuits composed of the
CMOS inverter technology. A basic CMOS inverter is shown in Figure 3.1. There
are two transistors: upper p − transistor and lower n − transistor. This CMOS
circuit acts as a logic switch, with states ON '1' and OFF '0'. For understanding
purpose consider p− transistor and n− transistor as two diﬀerent switches. These
switches turn on and oﬀ based on the potential diﬀerence across Vin. Applying a
positive voltage V at Vin causes the p− transistor to switch oﬀ and n− transistor
to switch on. This sets the Vout to ground while discharging the capacitor C. On
the other hand ground or low voltage at Vin causes the p− transistor to switch on
and n − transistor to switch oﬀ generating a high voltage at Vout. This will make
current I to ﬂow through p− transistor charging the capacitor C. This explains the
rationale behind the term inverter logic circuit. Here charging and discharging of the
capacitor cause a change in logic level between 1 and 0 caused due to current ﬂow.
This shows correlation between the data bits hamming distance and the current
hence the resulting electromagnetic side channels are data dependent. There is
another type of current Ishort caused due to short circuit when both p− transistor
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and n − transistor switch on at the same time i.e. both cause the ﬂow of current.
This is caused due to very small switching times between transistors, and may cause
them to turn on together. Even though they generate short burst of EM radiations,
they are not data dependent hence are not useful from side channel perspective, in
fact they can be a source of noise in the signal. There is a third kind of current
source drawn by the CMOS circuit, Istatic which is the static charge dissipated while
the circuit is in equilibrium condition i.e. when the circuit is in steady-state. In
steady-state there is no direct path between the input and the ground hence there is
no transition in output states, in other words output state is maintained. Evidence
suggests that static current is also susceptible to side channel attacks [45, 40]. Clock
edge and relative bits determine the logic state, and the events occurring on the
device. These states have a direct relationship with current ﬂow as explained above.
EM emissions give information about current ﬂow and hence information about the
state of the device.
Having discussed about source of EM emissions it is important to distinguish be-
tween the various type of EM radiation emitted from the device in order to identify
the target EM radiations for side channel attacks.
3.2.2 Types of EM Radiations
EM side channel from a device can be viewed as a sum of multiple EM radiations
emitting from diﬀerent components. Take an example of a modern SoC device,
it contains various components such as clock oscillators, blue-tooth modules, data
lines, WiFi, processor, memory components. Hence any data dependent EM side
channel leakage from such devices contains information about various other activities
on the device. Therefore it is important to identify the correct EM signal for side
channel attack. This requires an understanding of properties of EM radiations.
It is important to understand the concept of frequency and wavelength of an EM
radiation or signal at this point. A naive mathematical relationship for an EM wave
can be expressed as
f = cλ
where f is the frequency which is the number of cycles of the EM signal, c is the
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speed of light and λ is the wavelength of the EM signal which is distance between
two peaks or cycles.
From side channel point of view the frequency component of the EM signals is very
important as the EM side channel contains several frequency components, and it is
important to identify the side channel leaking frequency.
In order to better understand the EM side channel the resulting EM radiations can
be put into two main categories [1].
• Deliberate EM Radiations are those emission which are part of the normal
operation of the device. By normal operation it means all those components
which are intended to generate EM radiations. For example a microprocessor
running at clock frequency 100 MHz is supposed to generate a EM signal at
100 MHz. Similarly components such as wireless antennas, data lines and even
LCD devices emit radiations on various frequencies. These radiations are nor-
mally found at higher bandwidth and frequencies and may require expensive
equipment for acquiring and analyzing the side channel signals.
• Modulated EM Radiations are modulated signals on some carrier signals
such as the CPU clock oscillator. They are caused due to transfer of electrical
signals between tightly packed components on a device, where each compo-
nent acts as a transmitting antenna. For example EM signals from data lines
may modulate themselves on the strong signals such as main clock oscillator
increasing the amplitude of the resulting EM signal. This kind of signal is
amplitude modulated (AM). It may also be possible that EM signals are fre-
quency modulated (FM) when the electric signals from data lines modulate
on top of weak carrier frequencies.
While Deliberate EM Radiations may give more information at higher frequencies
exploiting them may be diﬃcult due to interfering noisy signals, in addition they
are relatively weak which means it is best to capture them very close to the target
device. On the other hand modulated signals can travel greater distance due to the
carrier signal hence making it possible to ﬁnd compromising frequencies even at a
distance. Modulated signals are often observed at lower frequencies and bandwidths
making it possible to exploit signals on diﬃcult targets using cheap equipment and
signal processing techniques.
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3.2.3 EM Side Channel Techniques
For exploiting the EM side channel leakage, we need to analyze the properties of side
channels along with the target software and a hardware implementation in order to
develop the appropriate technique. There are a number of techniques mentioned in
the literature which are described here.
Simple Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relies on the fact that power consumption
on the device such as a microprocessor directly correlates with the EM leakage and
the operations running on the processor. The EM radiations collected in SCA can
directly extract the secret key related information by visual inspection [39, 55]. This
is a powerful method as it requires just a single trace to break the cryptographic
implementation. This also shows the weakness in the implementation of the crypto-
graphic primitive and the simple architecture of the target hardware. However they
require use of expensive equipment to capture EM radiations. In modern complex
SoC architectures SCA is not very useful due to noisy side channels.
Diﬀerential Side Channel Analysis This technique was ﬁrst published by Kocher
et al. [39]. These attacks rely on the fact that EM radiations contain information
about the data being processed on the device such as the activity on data lines
or dynamic power consumption due to hamming distance or static power due to
hamming weight of that data being processed. The data related information are
usually in the form of very weak signals and cannot be detected by inspecting the
EM side channel. Typically EM side channel contain more information related to
strong signals usually due to processor activity. Collecting many similar traces and
applying statistical methods can identify these weak signals. Figure 3.2 shows a
simple diﬀerential attack model in a nutshell. A typical attack scenario works by
ﬁrst capturing the EM traces for some number of encryption operations using the
same key k. The attack assumes that at some point in time t an intermediate value
X is available. This value depends on small portion of the key k. The traces are
split into two buckets B0 = X|bkhi = 1 and B1 = X|bkhi = 0, where bkhi is the value
of the ith bit of the hypothetical key kh. This is repeated until all the bits of small
key portion k are exhausted. The traces in both the buckets are averaged to a mean
value Σ and a diﬀerence ∆ of the averaged traces are taken.
∆(t) = Σ(t)B0 − Σ(t)B1
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Figure 3.2 Diﬀerential Side Channel Analysis
For the correct key bit guess bkhi the diﬀerence is shown as huge spike in the resulting
EM trace and for the incorrect key guess the resulting trace is mostly ﬂat. This is
repeated for all the key bits, where kh = k for correct key guess. This only works if
the intermediate value X always fall in the same point in time in all the traces and
the traces are properly aligned in time. Also suﬃciently large number of traces are
available.
Template Attacks Template attacks also rely on the fact that device power con-
sumption is data dependent, however unlike diﬀerential side channel attacks, tem-
plate attacks consist of two steps, template building and template matching [41].
Template attacks also consider noise as part of the signal and make no eﬀorts to
reduce it. During template building the attacker gets hold of a proﬁling device
identical to the device under attack. Cryptographic operations are executed on the
proﬁling device with a choice of secret key and plain text while multiple EM traces
are captured for each operation. An average of the multiple EM traces for each
operation is the signal part of a template and the diﬀerence between average and
the signal is the noise. During template matching, if the target device performs
one of the operations similar to proﬁling device, the EM traces from target should
correlate with templates with high probability hence ﬁnding the correct operation.
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3.3 Previous work on EM Side Channel Attacks
The ﬁrst documented evidence about using EM radiations as covert channels dates
back to 1982 when NSA released a document under the name TEMPEST program.
This document provides a guideline about possible compromising EM radiations and
shielding requirements for the electronic devices to protect against leaking sensitive
information through EM radiations.
In 2001, the ﬁrst practical attack was published by Gandolﬁ et al. [20] in which they
demonstrated the use of EM side channel to attack three diﬀerent CMOS chips. This
paper demonstrated that the EM side channel is a sum of EM leakage from smaller
sub components and hence can be separated to ﬁnd leakage source from individual
components. Moreover they found that most compromising EM signals were found
around the main processing unit. They compared results with power analysis attacks
and found EM attacks to be more eﬀective. Their hand made copper-wire magnetic
loop probes were able to capture EM signals close to the target device.
Agrawal et al. [2] were able to classify diﬀerent kind of EM radiations, one that are
intentional and other that are modulate on some carrier. They attacked DES, RSA
and COMP128 implementation on smart card and SSL accelerators. They found
out EM side channels are indeed composed of multiple compromising frequencies
that manifest themselves as integer multiples of system clock harmonics. Their
results showed that modulated EM signals can be targeted using cheap equipment
and provides more useful side channel leakage than compared to signals at clock
frequency.
Gebotys et al. [21] targeted a practical application of Rijndael and ECC on an
embedded PDA device. Their work was based on frequency domain analysis using
a spectrogram in order to capture both time and frequency information. They used
frequency information to develop a diﬀerential EM analysis as the time domain
signal was subjected to misalignments.
G. Kenworthy and P. Rohatgi [35] showed side channel vulnerabilities of modern
mobile devices by targeting RSA and ECC implementations using cheap EM signal
acquisition setup. They turned oﬀ all radio and wireless communications so signals
observed in EM trace are only from processor related activity. They successfully
extracted keys using near and far ﬁeld antennas while using cheap radio equipment
and digitizers.
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Montminy et al. [44] in 2013 showed a successful diﬀerential EM attack on AES
running on a 32 bit microprocessor. They used cheap software deﬁned radios and
demonstrated the EM signal acquisition at sub Nyquist sampling rate, where Nyquist
sampling rate states the minimum sampling frequency must be twice the maximum
frequency component of the signal to avoid signal aliasing. They sampled EM signals
at 4 MSa/s and 2 MSa/s for center frequencies in the range 50 to 70 MHz. Results
showed that at lower sampling rates there is more noise in the collected signal which
was compensated by collecting many EM traces 5000-10000 to perform correlation
based diﬀerential EM side channel attack.
G. Goller and G. Sigl [26] were able to demonstrate an attack on modern SoC based
smart phones using far ﬁeld antennas and cheap software deﬁned radios. They also
showed how the compromising EM signals are found at processor clock frequency.
Their work was based on RSA square-and-multiply algorithm. The attack utilized
averaging multiple traces of RSA modular exponentiation using the same key. They
were able to emphatically prove using correlation the minimum number of traces
required for averaging to successfully extract key. Moreover the number of traces
required increased as the distance from the device increased due to additional envi-
ronmental noise and weak EM signals. They were able to extract the key at 80cm
from the target device while using 1894 EM traces.
Longo et al. [40] in 2015 conducted an in depth analysis of EM side channel on
complex SoC ARM development board. The target implementations were software
based OpenSSL AES implementations running on the ARM core as well as hardware
AES on crypto co-processor and the ARM NEON core. Their method used a leakage
detection Test Vector Leakage Assessment while scanning the SoC surface to select
the EM traces. They found the compromising EM signals at frequencies around 50
MHz. They also demonstrated the eﬀect of diﬀerent clock rates on ARM core which
is feature of modern SoC device. Their results suggested that signiﬁcant amount
of eﬀort is required to ﬁnd the EM frequencies that leak side channel information,
however a leakage detection test can signiﬁcantly improve ﬁnding compromising
frequencies. In order to improve the signal to noise ratio of the EM signals they
utilized decisioning methodology Wavelet Analysis. A template matching based
attack was developed on the collected traces. The paper also demonstrated the
misalignment eﬀect of preemptive hardware and software interrupts on the EM trace
during AES execution and demonstrated a template based matching of interrupted
versus clean trace to identify the interrupts. However all interrupted traces were
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discarded.
Genkin et al. [22] demonstrated an attack on a diﬀerent class of devices such as
PCs and laptops. The target software implementation was RSA and ElGamal ﬁxed
window exponentiation of GnuPG library. The attack used very low grade software
deﬁned radio and hand made co-axial cable loop antenna. The frequency modulated
EM signals at frequency between 1.5 to 2 MHz were targeted around a relatively
narrow bandwidth of around 100kHz. Their attack was made successfully using
signal processing methods. Unlike [40] this paper dealt with interrupts by removing
them from the traces. They applied a correlation based search of interrupted with
clean traces on small window of the signal and then removing samples that corre-
sponds to interrupts. The misalignment in time was also corrected using a similar
technique. The key recovery was possible with a few hundred traces using a chosen
cipher text for decryption.
Recently in 2016 two papers have been published with attacks on Elliptic Curve
cryptography. The ﬁrst paper [23] demonstrated an attack on Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange ECDH scheme on PCs. This attack features a very low
bandwidth attack using cheap equipment. They targeted GnuPG point multiplica-
tion which uses NAF representation. In order to recover the key, a trace aggregation
was performed for multiple point multiplications. The interrupts and phase shifts
were compensated before averaging. The attack did not rely on extracting individ-
ual Double and Add operations, rather the Add operations were identiﬁed using a
chosen cipher text. They also demonstrated how to distinguish between an Add with
1 and −1 digits since it is a signed representation. The attack was able to extract
a key with 75 traces in 3.75 seconds. The second paper [24] is based on OpenSSL
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) algorithm. Their work demonstrated the
partial extraction of Double and Add sequence from a single EM trace at very low
frequencies around 200kHz. They were able to identify the location of individual
Add operations in the EM trace using a blind source separation technique called
Singular Spectrum Analysis. However they did not identify the individual Double
operations, but they were rather estimated by calculating the distance between the
Add operations. A lattice based attack was used to recover the key used for digital
signature from partial information of the random scalar in each point multiplication
during the signing process.
The work in this thesis has combined the understanding obtained from previous
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research, while attacking a diﬀerent target device and OpenSSL Elliptic Curve point
multiplication. Moreover the attack demonstrated in the thesis will extract complete
sequence of Double and Add operations using a single trace.
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4. SIGNAL PROCESSING OF EM SIDE
CHANNELS
EM radiations must be captured and processed before any side channel informa-
tion can be extracted. While the capturing phase is dependent on the acquisition
equipment such as Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR), Oscilloscopes, Digitizers, the pro-
cessing stage is mostly done using digital signal processing tools. A digital signal is
a set of samples x[n] sampled at ﬁxed point in time such that x[n] = y(nT ) where
T is the sampling rate for continuous signal y(t). The sampling rate is dependent
on the Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) of the acquisition device. Theoreti-
cally a signal must be sampled at least twice the maximum frequency component
or bandwidth represented in the signal also known as Nyquist rate. In side channel
analysis the sampling rate is selected based on the maximum frequency component
of the signal of interest. However use of cheap equipment such as SDR allow to
capture signals at sub Nyquist rate. A lower sampling rate introduces more noise
in the signal and requires additional signal processing steps to compensate for that.
There are also other factors such as interfering signals in addition to the side channel
signals that add noise. EM side channel signal processing is the identiﬁcation and
extraction of the side channel related components in the signal. In order to do that
we need to understand what are these components, how are they contained in the
signal and how to extract them. Perhaps one of the most important if not the most
important aspect of EM side channel analysis is the signal processing and analysis
step. This section gives a brief theoretical background on signals, followed by the
signal processing techniques usually applied for EM side channel analysis. Although
there are many diﬀerent techniques developed for signal processing of EM side chan-
nel depending on the target device and attack methodology, the ones presented here
are in the context of side channel attacks presented in the thesis.
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4.1 Frequency Analysis of EM signals
An EM side channel consists of several diﬀerent signal components also refereed
to as frequency components. Mathematically these frequency components can be
represented with Fourier Series
f(x) = 1
2
a0 +
∑∞
n=1 an cos(
npi x
K
) + bn sin(
npi x
K
)
where (an, bn) are expressed as
an =
1
K
∫ K
−K f(x) cos(
npi x
K
) dx, bn =
1
K
∫ K
−K f(x) sin(
npi x
K
) dx.
The term cos(npi x
K
) and sin(npi x
K
) are periodic signals such that cos(npi (x+T )
K
) =cos(npi x
K
)
where T is the period of the signal which is a single oscillation in unit time. The
frequency f which is the number of oscillations per second is the reciprocal of time
period T . The symbol K is a positive integer which speciﬁes the periodicity in the
signal where as n is the multiple harmonics of the signal.
T = 2K
n
, f = n
2K
In side channel analysis EM radiations are composed of multiple harmonics of the
target frequencies, so it is possible that side channel leakage information is contained
in several diﬀerent frequencies. To analyze the signal in frequency domain the signal
is decomposed into its frequency components. For a discrete signal x[n] a Fourier
Transform shows the frequency spectrum of the signal
X(ω) =
∑∞
n=−∞ x[n]cos(ωn)− jsin(ωn)
where ω = 2pi
2K
= pi
K
is the angular frequency.
Frequency domain analysis works well when we need to ﬁnd periodic components in
a signal, however in EM side channel analysis we need to ﬁnd the signal behavior in
particular time, in other words we need to know which frequency components are
active during a speciﬁc period in time. For this a tool known as Spectrogram a.k.a.
Short Term Fourier Transform is utilized which allow us to take Fourier transforms in
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Figure 4.1 Time plot, Frequency plot and Spectrogram plot of the same signal
short window of time. The smaller the window size, the higher is the time resolution
and lower the frequency resolution and vice versa. Mathematically it is a function
of both time and frequency
Xs(ω, τ) =
∑∞
n=−∞ x[n]w(n− τ)cos(ωn)− jsin(ωn)
where w[n] is the window function and τ is the small shift in the window over the
signal samples in time.
Figure 4.1 shows a frequency plot and a spectrogram of the same signal. The
frequency plot is only giving overall view of each frequency component in the entire
signal where as the spectrogram also shows the time information of these frequencies.
This is very useful in identifying the timing information of cryptographic operations
and extracting frequencies only at speciﬁc points in time.
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4.2 Extraction of Target Frequencies
The term target frequencies refers to those frequencies that contain signals which can
be exploited to attack cryptographic systems. For identifying side channel patterns
in the signal these frequencies must be extracted from the rest of the signal using
ﬁlters. Although ﬁlters can be both digital and analog, the ones described here are
the digital ﬁlters since we are dealing with digital signals. In broader terms a ﬁlter
is designed to either block frequencies above a certain cutoﬀ frequency ωc known
as Low Pass Filter, pass all the frequencies above ωc which is a High Pass Filter,
or pass frequencies within a range of frequencies between ωc1 and ωc2 which is a
Band Pass Filter. The choice of ﬁlter depends on the application, for example in
EM side channel the ﬁrst step for analysis is to apply a digital band pass ﬁlter to
isolate a small stream of frequencies from a large river [40, 44]. Low pass ﬁlters
in EM side channel analysis are particular useful to suppress high frequency noise
and smooth the signal to identify the shape of the signal [22] or to ﬁnd signals in
very low frequencies [23, 24]. A digital ﬁlter falls into two main categories Finite
Impulse Response (FIR) and Inﬁnite Impulse Response (IIR). The FIR ﬁlters are
weighted sum of the past inputs whereas the IIR are the weighted sums of the input
as well as output which makes it inﬁnite as there is a feedback from the output to the
input. Talking in terms of side channel analysis we need a ﬁlter to respond to certain
frequencies also known as Frequency Response of the ﬁlter which is mathematically
expressed as:
for FIR,
H(ejω) =
∑M
n=0 bne
−jωn
and for IIR,
H(ejω) =
∑M
n=0 bne
−jωn∑N
n=0 ane
−jωn
where e−jωn = cos(ωn) − jsin(ωn) using Euler's theorem. A ﬁlter tries to approxi-
mate the Frequency response of the input signal to desired Frequency response using
the set of coeﬃcients bn in FIR and ann, bn in IIR ﬁlter. The order of the ﬁlter is the
number of coeﬃcients used in the weighted sum. There are no strict rules to choose
between IIR and FIR, however there are few signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The FIR are
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more stable as they can converge to a linear solution which is not the case in IIR due
to their inﬁnite response. However FIR needs to have more number of coeﬃcients
to get the desired frequency response hence computationally more expensive. The
design of IIR is more close to analog ﬁlters where the magnitude response is lim-
ited to the frequency selection such as high pass low pass or band pass. FIR ﬁlters
on the other hand can be used to design ﬁlters that have arbitrary response and
are useful to extract frequencies that are not possible using normal ﬁlters. In EM
side channel analysis while IIR ﬁlters can be useful in ﬁltering out frequencies with
low attenuation around some cutoﬀ point with low order ﬁlers [44] or for removing
certain amplitude oﬀset from the signal [34], the FIR ﬁlters are widely used in EM
side channel properties due to their stable design and the ﬂexibility of optimizing
ﬁlter coeﬃcient based on the signal characteristics. For instance the class of FIR
ﬁlters called matching ﬁlters can be particular useful to improve the diﬀerential and
template attacks in presence of noise in the signal. [46, 30].
4.3 EM Signal Noise Treatment
Although simple ﬁlters are useful for removing unwanted frequencies, they might not
remove all the noise present in the signal. Such noise may arrive from quantization
error due to low sampling rate, or very high energy signal frequency interfering
with low energy side channel frequency, or due to certain side channel frequency
present for a very short period of time in the EM signal. There are various methods
developed for treating noisy signals in EM side channel literature. The most applied
method for both diﬀerential analysis and simple analysis is averaging multiple traces
to increase the signal to noise ratio [26, 40, 22]. However there are two major
problems with this method, ﬁrst it requires multiple traces depending on the noise
level they may vary between 100 to 10000. Which means each trace should be
identical and must be aligned properly with each other. Secondly they only work
if the secret key is ﬁxed for each encryption or decryption operation, which means
it will not work with schemes such as ECDSA where the secret scalar is generated
for every new signature. This is why diﬀerential attacks which require statistical
approximation of multiple traces are not practical against ECDSA schemes.
Another technique applied for denoising in side channel attacks is Blind Source
Separation which tries to extract a speciﬁc signal component without having any
knowledge about the signal components and how diﬀerent components in signal are
present [47]. This is a very eﬀective technique in side channel attacks where there is
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limited signal information available or in some cases only a single EM trace to work
with [4, 43, 24].
The denoising method applied in this thesis is based on Wavelet Transforms. Like
blind source separation wavelet based denoising also decomposes the signal into var-
ious components and separates the time localized frequency components from the
overall signal. However there is one diﬀerence, for wavelet a prior signal knowledge
can be useful and it requires only wavelet coeﬃcients for denoising. Blind source
separation on the other hand also requires a matrix for the source signals in other
words we require to store signal information for approximating denoising coeﬃcients
[47]. In diﬀerential and template based EM side channel analysis wavelet denoising
technique has proven to signiﬁcantly improve the quality of signals where side chan-
nel features are present for a very short period of time and over shadowed by a long
trend in noise [18, 40].
4.3.1 Wavelet Transform
Wavelet transforms can be seen as the extension of spectrogram analysis, however
unlike spectrogram the window size in wavelet is not ﬁxed and can be both scaled
and shifted on the signal samples [28]. This is achieved by using a wavelet function
known as Mother Wavelet. It is also worth mentioning that in contrast to frequency
analysis which is a series of sin and cosine functions the wavelet can be represented
by much wider selection of functions for signal analysis. Mathematically a wavelet
transforms splits a function or a signal f(t) into set of wavelet coeﬃcients or basis
derived from mother wavelet
WT (s, l) =
∫∞
t=−∞ ψ
∗
s,l(t)f(t)dt
where ψ∗s,l the complex conjugate of
ψs,l(t) =
1√
|s|ψ
(
t−l
s
)
is the Mother Wavelet as a function of shifting factor l and scaling factor s. The
shifting factor l shifts the wavelet function over the signal in time where as the
scaling factor s selects the appropriate frequencies and scales the window span. The
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coeﬃcients are calculated by continuously scaling and shifting the wavelet function
over the signal which is why they are called continuous wavelet transform. Mother
Wavelet function can be chosen from a set referred to as wavelet family.
As the EM signals are sampled at discrete intervals and we are looking for signal
features in speciﬁc points in time, using continuous wavelets will give us redundant
coeﬃcients. As these coeﬃcients are put into a transformation matrix to transform
the input signal, they must be minimized for achieving computational eﬃciency.
This brings us to the notion of Discrete Wavelet Transforms which applies transla-
tion and scaling at discrete samples. The Mother Wavelet Transform for Discrete
Wavelet Transforms is given by [9]
ψs,l(t) =
1√
js
ψ
(
t−lkjs
js
)
where scaling factor j = 2 is the dyadic scaling and the translation factor k = 1 is
the dyadic translation.
Form the implementation point of view Discrete Wavelet Transforms can be seen
consisting of High pass Hp and Low pass Lp ﬁlters and Decimation factor D. The
wavelet transformation decomposes the signal x[n] into N levels where each level
decomposition is expressed by
di = DHp and ci = DLp where i = 0...N − 1
The coeﬃcients di and ci are called detail coeﬃcients and approximation coeﬃcients
respectively. In other words at each level of decomposition the signal frequencies
are decomposed into high and low, with D decimation factor of two applied at each
level. The decimation factor is used as the number of samples in decomposed signals
contain half the samples of the original signal. This is a recursive decomposition
where each level approximation coeﬃcient ci is fed as an input to the next level i.e.
at level N the decomposition coeﬃcients are [cN , dN , ..., d0]. In order to reconstruct
the signal back the same process is applied in the reverse order, i.e. the coeﬃcients
dN and cN are ﬁrst up-sampled with a factor of two and the reconstruction high pass
and low pass ﬁlter are convolved to construct cN−1. This is also known as Mallat
algorithm. [9, 53].
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4.3.2 Wavelet Denosing
Wavelet denoising is performed on the input signal using the following steps
wavelet decomposition → coeﬃcient thresholding → wavelet reconstruction
The core of denoising through wavelets is the selection of appropriate thresholding
factor λ. This thresholding factor depends on the level of wavelet decomposition.
The thresholding is applied to high frequency components which are the detail co-
eﬃcients di as most of the noise is present in high frequencies. Wavelet thresholding
can either be Hard thresholding or Soft thresholding. Hard thresholding sets all the
detail coeﬃcients to zero which are less than or equal to λ i.e. Th(di) = 0 for di ≤ λ
and Th(di) = di for di > λ. On the other hand soft thresholding not only sets the
detail coeﬃcients to zero but also subtracts the threshold value from any details
coeﬃcient greater than threshold i.e. Th(di) = 0 for di > λ and Th(di) = di − λ for
di > λ. Soft thresholding also known as wavelet shrinkage is a more eﬀective method
for denoising as it tries to approximate all the detail coeﬃcient to zero resulting in
a greater bias towards smooth signal [19].
The eﬀectiveness of this denoising technique is demonstrated during a practical
attack on the SoC device in Chapter 5. It is also worth mentioning that unlike
previous work on wavelet transformation on EM side channel analysis which is based
on diﬀerential and template attacks [18, 40, 16] the attack mentioned here uses a
single EM trace and wavelet denoising helped clean interfering noise as the probe
collects EM signals around 3 cm from the device.
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5. EM SIDE CHANNEL ANALYSIS IN
PRACTICE
The EM side channel techniques are proven to be very eﬀective against complex
SoC architectures [22, 24, 26]. In oder to evaluate its eﬀectiveness a number of ex-
periments have been performed on cryptographic libraries running on a SoC device.
The details of the experiments and the results obtained are discussed here.
5.1 Experimental Setup
This section underlines the setup for acquiring and processing the EM side channel.
One of the goals for performing side channel analysis was to use low cost equipment.
The tools and equipment are listed
• EM Probe Tekbox Near-Field magnetic loop probe H-20 with frequency re-
sponse in range 500 kHz to 3 Ghz and loop size of 2 cm.
• Ampliﬁer Tekbox wide-band ampliﬁer with a ﬂat frequency range of 3 MHz
to 3 GHz and gain of 40 dB is used to amplify the weak EM signals.
• Software Deﬁned Radio For acquiring and digitizing the EM radiations
a software deﬁned radio BladeRF from Nuand was used. BladeRF has a
frequency range of 300 MHz to 3.8 GHz. In order to ﬁnd EM leakage at lower
frequencies a transverter expansion board was used to enhance the frequency
range below 300 MHz. BladeRF can sample up to 40 MSps but we used a 2
MSps conﬁguration in order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the attack at low
sampling rates. BladeRF has a 12-bit ADC resolution and 28 MHz bandwidth.
• Signal Processing Matlab R2015b was used for signal processing of EM side
channel.
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5.2 Target SoC Device
The target device was chosen to be Texas Instruments AM335x Sitara SoC based
on ARM Cortex-A8 processor embedded on Beaglebone Black single board
system. As already established, the EM side channel radiations are due to memory
and processor activity [1, 14, 15] so we need to have an insight about the archi-
tecture of the SoC. The processor supports two instruction sets. A 32-bit Integer
integer instruction set and NEON ﬂoating point instruction set for Single Instruc-
tion Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions with a 128 bits register support. There is
dedicated L1 cache for both integer and NEON core, however L2 cache is shared.
In addition there is a dedicated shared on-chip memory. The processor has multiple
power trains and clock rates which vary depending on the work load. The SoC
also contains a dedicated cryptographic co-processor and graphics processing unit
(GPU), where all the components are connected via Open Core Protocol (OCP)
L3/L4 interconnect. Table 5.1 gives a more detailed description of the speciﬁca-
tions. Due to this architectural complexity, the EM radiations from the device also
contains information about activity from other components which act as noise in
side channel measurements. This requires extraction of the target signals through
use of signal processing methods as discussed later in the attack.
Table 5.1 Sitara XAM3359AZCZ100 Processor Speciﬁcations
Processor ARM Cortex-A8
Supported Clock-rates 300,600,600,800,1000 (MHz)
Integer Instruction set pipelined, 10 stages
NEON Instruction set pipelined, 6 stage
Co-processor cryptographic accelerator
Graphics 3D accelerator
L1 Cache 64KB
L2 Cache 256 KB
On-Chip Memory 128KB
DRAM 512 MB DDR3
The Beaglebone Black comes with a Linux Ångström based on Debian 7 "wheezy"
version 3.8.13-bone70 as default Operating System. The default conﬁgurations were
kept and no eﬀorts were made what so ever to change the conﬁgurations. Which
means all the default Operating System services were running. It is also a key point
to mention here that the operating system switches between tasks using preemptive
scheduling, this switching causes interrupts which also cause noise in the signals.
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Figure 5.1 Spectrogram showing the initial test code iterating through add, multiply and
memory operations
The Beaglebone was powered with a +5V power adapter and commands were sent
using serial UART interface.
5.3 Identifying Side Channel Leakage
Before the actual attacks on the cryptographic primitives the EM side channel leak-
age needs to be detected which correlates to certain processor/memory activity.
There are two reasons for this initial investigation, ﬁrst to ﬁnd the optimal probe
position and secondly to access how viable is the side channel information for de-
tecting the operations running on the processor. For this purpose a magnetic probe
with a smaller loop size of 5 mm was ﬁrst used to run an initial scan. Use of smaller
probes requires them to be very close to the device, less then 5mm, and captures
limited EM radiations only from the surface they are exposed to, which means less
noise from surrounding components. For this purpose a test code was executed
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which looped through 100 add instructions with a memory fetch and 100 multiply
with memory load instructions followed by a sleep for 0.05 seconds. Figure 5.1
shows the spectrum of this test code in frequencies around 10 MHz.
By moving the probe over the SoC surface, one area was identiﬁed which yielded the
best Signal to Noise ratio. This showed a clear processor and DRAM related side
channel leakage was present. The only purpose of this step was to get an idea how
the device leaks side channel related information. However in the later experiments
while attacking the actual cryptographic implementation, the probe with larger loop
size of 2 cm was used, which allowed to capture EM signals from a distance but also
introduced noise.
5.4 Attack on Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication
The attack presented utilized a single trace to recover the point Double and Add op-
erations in ECC point multiplication. For this purpose OpenSSL was used which is a
popular open source cryptography library implemented in C programming language.
The library is widely utilized for implementing Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocols. A number of ECC curves are
supported by OpenSSL, out of which secp256k1 was chosen for the attack. This
curve has recently gained popularity since its use in Bitcoin digital currency. It is
deﬁned over prime ﬁeld Fp with the following parameters which are ﬁxed
• 256-bit prime ﬁeld representation FR: FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF
FFFF FFFFFFFF FFFF FFFF FFFFFFFF FFFE FFFF FC2F
• 256-bit x-coordinate of generator point P in Fp: 79BE 667E F9DC BBAC
55A0 6295 CE87 0B07 029B FCDB 2DCE 28D9 59F2 815B 16F8 1798
• 256-bit y-coordinate of generator point P in Fp: 483A DA77 26A3 C465 5DA4
FBFC 0E11 08A8 FD17 B448 A685 5419 9C47 D08F FB10 D4B8
• 256-bit order n: FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFE BAAE
DCE6 AF48 A03B BFD2 5E8C D036 4141
• cofactor h: 01
OpenSSL secp256k1 is based on Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) curves [10].
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1 r_is_at_infinity = 1;
2
3 for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
4 i f (! r_is_at_infinity) {
5 i f (! EC_POINT_dbl(group , r, r, ctx))
6 goto err;
7 }
8
9 for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) {
10 i f (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) {
11 int digit = wNAF[i][k];
12 int is_neg;
13
14 i f (digit) {
15 is_neg = digit < 0;
16
17 i f (is_neg)
18 digit = -digit;
19
20 i f (is_neg != r_is_inverted) {
21 i f (! r_is_at_infinity) {
22 i f (! EC_POINT_invert(group , r, ctx))
23 goto err;
24 }
25 r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted;
26 }
27
28 /* digit > 0 */
29
30 i f (r_is_at_infinity) {
31 i f (! EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >>
↪→ 1]))
32 goto err;
33 r_is_at_infinity = 0;
34 } e l se {
35 i f (! EC_POINT_add
36 (group , r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1],
↪→ ctx))
37 goto err;
38 }
39 }
40 }
41 }
42 }
Algorithm 5.1 OpenSSL point multiplication ec_mult.c
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The point multiplication on this curve is implemented using wNAF representation
as described in Algorithm 2.8, however OpenSSL also uses the so called "interleaved
scalar" by point multiplication [10] for better eﬃciency. This method decomposes
the scalar into two parts and performs interleaved point multiplications on them.
However the scalar interleaving only works if pre computation of point multipli-
cations are enabled using certain conditions in the code which were disabled by
default in our case. We used a C code harness that calls OpenSSL point multiplica-
tion function pointer EC_POINT_mul running in a loop. This function uses a
random scalar k and a point Q on the curve. The C harness also contains command
line parameters to loop through individual Add operations EC_POINT_add and
double operations EC_POINT_dbl to ﬁnd EM leakage corresponding to these
operations rather than the complete point multiplication leakage. These function
pointers invoke the OpenSSL point multiplication method ec_mult.c listed in Al-
gorithm 5.1. By looking at the code we can ﬁnd two loops at line 3 and 9. The
ﬁrst loop iterates over each digit of the scalar k. There is always one point dou-
ble operation at the start as variable r_is_at_infinity equals 1 in only the ﬁrst
iteration. The second for loop either executes once if no interleaving is applied
and twice if the scalar interleaving is applied. From the perspective of EM side
channel we are speciﬁcally interested in the two operations EC_POINT_dbl and
EC_POINT_add functions. The ﬁrst loop is executed for every digit calling the
EC_POINT_dbl function. For a non-zero digit we have either positive digits or
negative digits of scalar. A point addition is performed for non zero digits in the
inner for loop.
5.4.1 Attack Methodology
The software deﬁned radio captured the EM traces at 2MSa/s while EC point mul-
tiplication executes in a loop. We applied a frequency sweep across the spectrum
between 1 MHz and 100 MHz. We suspected the side channel information to be
in the lower frequencies as the point multiplication is a heavy operation and takes
millions of clock cycles and secondly the side channel signals are modulated to lower
frequencies due to signal coupling. Because the software deﬁned radio bandwidth
was limited to 28MHz, a window based sweep of the spectrum was done by adjusting
the center frequency. Figure 5.2 shows the spectrogram plot of the initial frequency
sweep from 0-50 MHz sweep. There are a number of frequencies identiﬁed in the
spectrum with higher signal energy close to 50MHz, so a pre-processing stage was
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Figure 5.2 Power Spectrum Density of 0 to 50 MHz while executing point multiplication
operation
applied to extract the frequencies that may yield side channel information. This
was done by modifying the code executed on SoC to alternate between multiple
iterations of Double followed by multiple iteration of Add operations. This clearly
identiﬁed two distinct patterns in the spectrogram as shown in Figure 5.3. One of
these frequencies can be selected as the target frequency to extract the Double and
Add operations. This was a tedious step as it involved selecting each frequency of in-
terest and analyzing it for a possible pattern that exhibits the sequence of operations
in point multiplication.
Extracting the Target Frequency After identifying the frequency we applied a
band pass ﬁlter around it. This was done by selecting the desired center frequency
for the SDR, in our case 40 Mhz, and applying a digital FIR ﬁlter to the raw signal.
By looking at the ﬁltered trace Figure 5.4 we can see some repeating spikes in the
signal.
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Figure 5.3 Spectrogram showing multiple invocations of point multiplication and addition
around 10 MHz frequency
Figure 5.4 Filtered Signal
Demodulation The ﬁltered trace was demodulated by applying a discrete Hilbert
transform and taking its absolute value. The resulting signal was passed through
Savitzky-Golay ﬁlter with a polynomial of order 3 and window size 11 which applies
the linear least square curve ﬁtting. This helped in suppressing high frequency noise
to improve the signal to noise ratio. In Figure 5.5 spikes are clearly visible, however
to extract the Double and Add operations we required to extract these peaks. Peak
extraction on this signal gave several false positives as there are noisy peaks in the
signal and even a carefully selected thresholding did not help. To mitigate this
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Figure 5.5 Demodulated Signal
Figure 5.6 Successfully extracted peaks after denoising
problem a signal denoising was performed so peaks corresponding to the interesting
frequencies can be isolated.
Noise Removal We applied Discrete Wavelet Transform based denoising as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. In our demodulated trace the signal of interest is overlapped by
other interfering signals and low frequency noise. So we decomposed the signal using
Haar wavelet into 5 levels. This resulted in a set of details coeﬃcients in higher fre-
quency bands for the signal of interest. All the coeﬃcients below a certain threshold
were set to zero. This eﬀectively removed the coeﬃcients that correspond to noise.
Moreover we applied soft thresholding as suggested by [19]. The soft thresholding
not only sets the detail coeﬃcients to zero but also approximates the retained de-
tail coeﬃcients towards zero in order to minimize any residual noise. The resulting
signal clearly shows identiﬁable spikes while all other noisy spikes are removed.
Peak Extraction This step extracted the peaks that identify the sequence of Dou-
ble and Add operations. This was done by calculating the optimal peak prominence
as a threshold to detect all the peaks that correlates to the leaked signals. Due to
the denoising performed in the previous step, peak extraction successfully extracted
the target peaks with zero error. Figure 5.6 shows denoised signal with extracted
peaks.
Double and Add Sequence Detection Although these peaks gave a clear in-
dication about each Double and Add operations, we still need to ﬁgure out where
each elliptic curve point multiplication starts and ends. In side channel analysis we
call this a trigger condition that identiﬁes the start and end of the cryptographic
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Figure 5.7 After Envelop Detection showing OpenSSL pre-computations at the start
Figure 5.8 Extracted Double and Add sequence
operations to extract the key dependent information. In our case the SDR was con-
tinuously capturing EM signals so having some interrupt based trigger was not an
option, although it was possible to use a GPIO of the SoC to send interrupt signals
before start and end of point multiplication. However that would not serve the
purpose of using SDR for non-invasive attack model. However by investigating the
signal we found a speciﬁc patter at the start and end of each point multiplication
operation. OpenSSL performs an internal pre-computation stage before each scalar
multiplication operation and this might explain the reason for this signal behavior.
Figure 5.7 shows the start of the point multiplication, these peaks are not part of ac-
tual point multiplication but the Double and Add operations in the pre-computation
of OpenSSL. In order to recover the scalar dependent operations we had to separate
these peaks from the rest of the signal and also use this information to detect the
start of the signal. This was achieved by creating an envelope on the signal in a way
that peaks that were close together approximated to a single peak while other peaks
stayed separate. The method used for envelope detection was root mean square
where we found the window size of 10 samples gave the best results. The result-
ing signal showed a large enveloped peak at the start of each point multiplication
and smaller peaks to identify double and operations which is shown in Figure 5.7.
The ﬁnal signal fully extracted the Double and Add operations. The peaks closer
together showing Double operations and peaks further apart are Double and Add
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operations.
Interrupt Detection The interrupts caused by the OS and hardware introduce
noise to the signals, so we need to identify them to successfully extract key dependent
operations. The interrupt in our signal was clearly identiﬁed as a huge gap in the
signal, as contrary to [40, 24] where authors suggested they appear as spikes. The
reason could be the frequencies we were using, the signal processing steps involved
and the characteristics of the target device. In order to identify the interrupts we
did a correlation analysis of a reference trace with interrupted trace as suggested by
[23]. The correlation was performed by ﬁrst identifying the beginning of signal, then
applying small window of reference trace with target trace, and repeating this over
the entire signal. If an interrupt was detected that part of the signal was removed
by removing the samples. If this step corrupted the signal it was dropped and next
signal was taken.
Extracting Scalar Bits The attack successfully extracted the complete Double and
Add operations with a success rate of over 95%. These Double and Add operations
however do not reveal the secret scalar k involved in point multiplication kP . Taking
the use case of point multiplication in the ECDSA signature generation, the scalars
k act as nonces i.e. they are randomly generated for each scalar multiplication kP in
a signature hence a diﬀerent sequence of Double and Add in each processed signal.
As the scalar is represented in wNAF form where each non-zero digit in scalar
belongs to the set {±1,±3,±5,±7}. So mapping the Double and Add sequence
to the key is not straightforward as we need to know which digit is represented
from the set for each point addition. The key extraction can be done using Lattice
based attack on the sequence of Double and Add operations as demonstrated by
Brumley and Hakala [11] and Yuval et al. [6]. The attack starts by utilizing the
information that last Double and Add sequence is always represented as a 1 in the
LSB of scalar and works itself up by collecting successive signatures of Double and
Add sequences. The Table 5.2 shows four possible sequences of Double and Add
operations and the probability of occurrence of Add operations in LSB of the scalar.
These probabilities follow a Poisson distribution as there is a exponential decay in
the number of unknown scalar digits. Collecting a few hundred EM traces of Double
and Add sequences can extract the key using Lattice attack. Table 5.3 relates the
number of Double and Add sequences to probability of success and time required
for extracting the scalar using lattice attack on secp256k1 curve [6].
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Table 5.2 Sequence of Double and Add in LSB for Lattice attacks
Double and Add sequence LSB of scalar Probability of Add
...DA 1 1/2
...DAA 10 1/4
...DAAA 100 1/8
...DAAAA 1000 1/16
Table 5.3 Number of sequences and probability of successful scalar bits extraction using
Lattice attacks on secp256k1
Number of Sequences Probability of Success Time in Seconds
240 0.5 2.68
300 53.0 13.54
480 87.0 11.55
520 96.0 10.50
5.5 Attack on RSA Modular Exponentiation
In order to attack RSA the left-to-right square and multiply algorithm of
GMP library was used with a 4096 bit key size. The method is straight forward
and ﬁnding the Square and Multiply operation directly maps to the secret key bits.
Utilizing the same method as discussed above, the signal was extracted around 10.5
MHz, however it was possible to ﬁnd similar signals in other frequencies. This attack
also utilized a single trace to extract the key related operations. After applying FIR
band pass ﬁlter, the trace was corrected by removing noise using wavelet transforms.
Figure 5.9 shows square and multiply operations of ﬁxed key. Here the larger peak is
the Square and Multiply where as smaller peaks are Square operations corresponding
to a 1 and 0 in the key respectively.
Figure 5.10 shows a processed trace from ﬁxed window algorithm of OpenSSL with
2048 bit key and window size 5. The dips here signify the Square and Multiply
operation, where each Multiply operation is followed by 5 Square operations. The
peak extraction however also had some false positives even after denoising, one
reason could be that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in processing times and power
consumption of Square and Square and Multiply operations on this SoC device.
However averaging techniques such as the ones applied here [26, 22] can improve the
results. The work in this thesis focused on single trace EM side channel analysis
using cheap equipment to prove its eﬀectiveness.
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Figure 5.9 Extracted Square and Multiply operations with low peak as Square and high
peak Square and Multiply
Figure 5.10 Extracted Square and Multiply operations with a window size 5
The results obtained for both RSA and ECC suggest strong evidence that crypto-
graphic implementations can leak secrete key dependent information irrespective of
the complex architecture of devices. Cryptographers must come up with implemen-
tations that have no correlations between secret keys and cryptographic operations.
The next chapter discuss some possible countermeasures that can mitigate this side
channel vulnerability, however implementing these countermeasures is out of the
scope of this thesis.
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6. SIDE CHANNEL COUNTERMEASURES
EM side channel is a proven technique to attack cryptographic systems, therefore
engineers must come up with implementations to thwart this vulnerability by de-
veloping side channel countermeasures. These countermeasures try to minimize any
information that relates side channel leakage to the cryptographic algorithm imple-
mentation details such as conditional branches, memory access, order of instruction
execution on the processor which can reveal the secret. From the perspective of
EM side channel this can be achieved in two diﬀerent ways: either by minimizing
the exploitable EM leakage from the device or by developing side channel resistant
software implementations. The following sections discuss some side channel counter-
measures that can reduce the secret dependent EM leakage exploited in the thesis.
Although these countermeasures are discussed for elliptic curve point multiplication,
the same analogy can be applied to modular exponentiations.
The EM side channel attacks using just one trace most often utilize the information
from timing variations on secret key dependent operations similar to the attacks
discussed in the thesis. These timing variations can come from the order and pro-
cessing times of instruction execution [39] and/or memory access patterns [12]. For
defeating the side channel leakage caused due to diﬀerence in operations such as el-
liptic curve point Double and Add from point Double, the straight forward solution
is to utilize a method that executes both the Double and Add operations on each
key dependent conditional branch of the executed code. An eﬃcient point multi-
plication method with constant time operations is Montgomery Ladder [32] listed
in Algorithm 6.1. We can see that during each conditional branch both the point
Addition and point Double is performed on the registers. Furthermore it is shown
[32] that the ﬁeld operations on the curve can be performed only on the x-coordinate
of the point, and that y-coordinate can be calculated directly from the x-coordinate,
this property makes this method more eﬃcient.
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Montgomery_Ladder( P , d )
P-> input point on the curve
d-> scalar bits
R_0 = P
R_1 = P + P
for i = size(d)-2 to 0
i f d(i)==1
R_0 = R_0 + R_1
R_1 = R_1 + R_1
e l se
R_1 = R_0 + R_1
R_0 = R_0 + R_0
return R_0
Algorithm 6.1 Montgomery Ladder point multiplication method
Recently S. Gueron and V. Krasnov [29] purposed a Montgomery friendly optimized
implementation of point multiplication for OpenSSL 256-bit prime curves with good
side channel resistance properties. The point multiplication is computed by ﬁrst con-
verting the point coordinates to Montgomery domain and then converting the result
of operations back to residue domain. This method can further achieve performance
improvement for 256 bit prime curves by slicing the 256-bits scalar into 4 words of
64-bits each for 64-bit architectures. In order to implement scalar multiplication
dP a window based method with Booth encoding using a window size of 7 is used,
implies a total of d256
7
e tables of precomputed values for ﬁeld operations on x and
y-coordinates. For side channel protection the tables are populated sequentially for
each window, and a mask is used which only keeps the required values with all other
table entries set to zero. This step ensures there is no memory access pattern de-
pending on the secret scalar, where as the Montgomery point multiplication ensures
constant time implementation.
Another countermeasure found in the literature for OpenSSL ECC by B. Brumley
[10] uses Regular NAF scalar encoding and software multiplexing. The Regular
NAF encoding ensures that the scalar uses a ﬁxed number of zero values between
non-zero digits. Software multiplexing is a countermeasure that removes memory
access patterns by iterating through the entire table in a ﬁxed order and extracting
only required values using a bitwise operation with a mask. This countermeasure
ensures no secret scalar dependent timing information is given away.
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It is also possible to reduce the amount of EM radiations from the device by applying
shielding methods or to redesign the CMOS circuits. On circuit design level, it is
required to remove the crosstalk between the external power of the CMOS chip
and the internal power of the logic gate. One proposed countermeasure is to use
decoupling capacitors in interleaving fashion [52, 49] where one capacitor charges
while the other discharges. The decoupling can reduce the side channel information
in power analysis, but may still leak EM radiations as these capacitors are used
on the chip level and a current ﬂow through the chip wires can still induce EM
radiations. A more recent countermeasure [27] suggests use of dedicated decoupling
cells for each logic gate, by using an integrated capacitor to remove cross talk between
the internal and external power supply of the logic gate. The circuit design ensures
that each cell gets its power from a nearby buﬀering capacitor which makes sure that
the current is kept within the cell, which signiﬁcantly reduces the EM radiations as
there is no current ﬂow through long wires. However, this claim is not proved with
experimental results and it may be possible to use signal processing methods to
enhance the information contained in weak EM signals.
Implementing security solutions on the hardware level can help mitigate some of
the problems found on software implementations. Hardware security makes use of
hardware-assisted technology with the aid of dedicated processor cores and hardware
modules to encapsulate the security critical operations, while the only access to the
external environment is passing secure information: for example, a bank transaction
authentication token. With an increase in the use of mobile devices, vendors are
now moving towards hardware based solutions due to their superior security features
and resistance against malware. Examples of such solutuons are Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE) and Trusted Platform Modules (TPM).
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7. CONCLUSION
This thesis provides evidence about the eﬀectiveness of EM side channel attacks on
well known OpenSSL implementations using just one trace. The results proves that
even mathematically strong and carefully written cryptographic implementations
can have side channel vulnerabilities, hence these implementations must be tested
for secure side channel properties. Moreover EM side channels can be very eﬀective
due to its non invasive nature and ability to break cryptographic implementation
using cheap equipment and signal processing methods. Therefore countermeasures
must be developed and tested against these side channels.
There is still no strong evidence to support the correlation between EM side channels
and micro-architecture design, such as how manipulating cache would eﬀect the EM
radiations. This is particularly important when developing countermeasures. An
extension of this attack could be to combine the cache-timing with EM side channels
for developing hybrid attacks adding another dimension to the attack. This can
also be useful in studying the eﬀects of EM radiations on loading the program to
memory. Moreover the countermeasures that address the memory addressing may
not be suﬃcient for EM side channels, as they can still leak information present in
the processor registers.
Reverse engineering hardware encryption modules such as Trusted PlatformModules
(TPM) using EM side channel templates is a very interesting future work. TPMs
are vendor speciﬁc solutions and for security reasons there are no speciﬁcations
available on how the cryptographic algorithms are embedded. Reverse engineering
using EM/Power Side channel is one solution. It requires carrying out detailed
analysis on these side channels and developing templates on each stage of algorithm
execution. These side channel templates can provide some insight into the working
of these TPMs and can be used to evaluate the security features.
EM side channel analysis is a promising area to target the Trusted Execution En-
vironments (TEE). TEE are secure sandboxes which eﬀectively creates a deﬁned
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boundary between secured code and unsecured code, providing conﬁdentiality and
integrity at the hardware level. As of this date, there are no studies to the best of
knowledge, to prove any side channel attacks on TEE. Even though these trusted
executions are isolated they still share the same device resources such as micro-
processor cores and memory resulting in EM side channel properties with similar
characteristics. Most of the devices now a days are equipped with TEE solutions
such as ARM TrustZone and AMD Platform Security Processor as they provide
enhanced security. However, these devices still radiate EM leakage and must be
investigated for any side channel vulnerabilities.
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